

Research Problem Review 78-19

LEVEL II

(2)

**AN APPROACH TO IMPROVING THE  
EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMY COMMANDERS IN  
MULTI-ETHNIC SETTINGS**

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ARI FIELD UNIT AT PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY

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Research Problem Review 78-19

(1) AN APPROACH TO IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMY  
COMMANDERS IN MULTI-ETHNIC SETTINGS

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
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## FOREWORD

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Since 1972 the Army Research Institute (ARI) has been active in research on the policy, operational problems, and programs of the Army's Race Relations/Equal Opportunity (RR/EO) program. In 1973, in response to a specific requirement of the Office of Equal Opportunity Programs of the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), ARI initiated the development of a Racial Harmony Training Program for Unit Commanders. The purpose of the program was to improve a commander's skills and effectiveness in handling multi-ethnic problems in his/her unit. This report, the first of three, covers the research involved in the development of the commanders' training program. The research was conducted under Army Project 2Q162108A743 "Race Harmony Promotion Programs" in the FY 74 Work Program, as an in-house effort augmented by a contract with Race Relations Consulting, Inc., under contract DAHC 19-73-C-0034.

Since 1974, the Army Equal Opportunity Research Program has been conducted at the Presidio of Monterey, Calif., Field Unit.

  
JOSEPH ZEIDNER  
Technical Director

AN APPROACH TO IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMY COMMANDERS IN  
MULTI-ETHNIC SETTINGS

BRIEF

Requirement:

*THIS REPORT develops*

~~To develop~~ a training program for company commanders designed to improve their effectiveness in handling race-related problems, and to conduct a preliminary field tryout of the curriculum.

Procedure:

ARI developed a 36-hour experimental training program on the basis of rationales generated from prior experience in dealing with commanders on race-related problems, and based it on the results of extensive interviews with 42 commanders and 104 enlisted men from several CONUS and USAREUR installations. ARI conducted field tryouts of the curriculum using two groups of company commanders at each of two Army installations. On a given installation, two different instructional methods of presenting the curriculum were used, one designed to correct cognitive distortions using persuasion, and the other designed to resolve emotional resistance using rational inquiry techniques. The impact of the training curriculum was determined by observation of classroom interactions and by analyses of questionnaire responses made by class participants.

Findings:

Neither instructional method was found to be consistently superior across all instructional objectives nor across all groups. There were interactions among classroom situational variables, course content, and method of instruction.

Observation of the impact of the field tryouts of the curriculum indicated that many organizational constraints operate against the implementation of race relations programs. Included were doubts about the extent and durability of command support for the program at post level, the apparent absence of incentives for successful contributions to the program, and fears about the results of honestly reporting racial problems.

The self-report evaluations of the impact of the curriculum indicated that the lesson objectives and topics which comprise the commanders' training were perceived as relevant by a substantial portion of commanders in the tryout groups. Eighty percent to 87% felt that the lesson objectives were relevant or highly relevant. The individual topics were enjoyed or enjoyed very much by 68% of the commanders. About 61% rated themselves as having experienced moderate to considerable change in the direction described by the course, without specifying the dimensions in which change occurred. An average of 61% felt that they learned from a moderate to a considerable amount from the individual topics.

#### Utilization of Findings:

The training program, geared to help commanders cope with their immediate needs in handling race-related problems, would fulfill an urgent need in the Army. However, before its utilization is recommended to the Army, an empirical evaluation needs to be conducted to determine the impact of training on the effectiveness or commander effectiveness in managing race-related problems.

# AN APPROACH TO IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMY COMMANDERS IN MULTI-ETHNIC SETTINGS

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## AN APPROACH TO IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMY COMMANDERS IN MULTI-ETHNIC SETTINGS

### INTRODUCTION

Historically, the Army, like the United States as a whole, has had formal policies of discrimination against minorities within it. More recently, the Army has been among the leaders nationally in providing equal opportunity for all minorities. As this effort progressed, and concurrently, demonstrations and physical confrontations expressed racial tension in the Army, more attention was directed to ending any formal or informal policies controlling the advancement of minorities within the Army. Steps were taken to increase mutual understanding among soldiers of all ranks. To some commanders this attention to equal opportunity and treatment was an important step in preserving combat effectiveness. To other commanders this focus overemphasized the problems of minority soldiers at the expense of command needs to preserve order, discipline, and effectiveness.

The different perceptions commanders have of the equal opportunity and treatment program help explain why commanders have responded unevenly to it. Although some commanders have implemented both the letter and the spirit of the program, others demonstrate an entire gradient of ineffective responses--noncompliance, tokenism, paternalism, and assimilation.

Noncompliance occurs when commanders point out the Army's leadership in race relations and ignore the general ineffectiveness in enforcing these regulations.

Tokenism occurs when commanders fail to face the full magnitude of race relations problems and instead develop a narrow, poorly staffed program to deal with a single aspect of the problem.

Paternalism occurs when commanders treat minorities as irresponsible children who cannot make decisions, even those affecting their own lives.

Assimilation occurs when commanders define the cause of racial tension as the resistance of the minority to conform to the norms of the Army. This approach obscures the existence of real discrimination within the Army in both career development and social life. These false responses stem from the illusion, often tacit, that the condition of minorities is steadily improving by itself or that it needs no improvement. For many Army leaders, the aggressive militancy of black soldiers today is hard to understand.

When blacks enter the Army, they hope that the new organization is based on equal opportunity and treatment for all and that their needs will be better met within the Army than they were in civilian life. However, many black soldiers discover that despite the policy of equal opportunity their needs as blacks are met only when they do not interfere with the needs and values of their superiors.

If leaders in the Army are to operate successfully within multi-ethnic units containing a substantial proportion of black soldiers, they must recognize the "fundamental difference between black adaptation and white adaptation. Many more whites than blacks were able to make . . . economic and environmental adaptation with less need for affectual or emotional relationships and supportive cultural forces. . . . Whites established and controlled the levels of American . . . social policy in a way that enabled the vast majority of white people to obtain a reasonable level of economic, social and psychological security."<sup>1</sup>

For several years the Army has been aware of the intensity of racial tension in military units stationed throughout the world. Black and other minority soldiers want the same opportunity to adapt within the Army as white soldiers, and, they want emotional and interpersonal conditions that will allow them to make this adaptation. The pervasive complaints of discrimination within the Army suggest an urgent need for commanders with the knowledge, motivation, and interpersonal skills to develop and maintain cohesive, multi-ethnic military units. The purpose of this report is to describe the development and field tryout of a training program designed to improve these qualities in company commanders.

#### DEVELOPING THE CURRICULUM

##### Rationale for the Training Program

Reasons for providing the company commander with a specialized educational program to help him implement Army Equal Opportunity policy depend upon three basic concepts:

The Acculturation of the Commander. Most officers are white, and many whites are insensitive to minority needs. If the Army creates no race relations problems but inherits those of civilian society, as seems likely, then white officers would have roughly the same racial attitudes as other whites.

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<sup>1</sup> Comer, James P., Beyond Black and White. New York: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1972, p. 146.

The Acculturation of Minority Group Members. Experience has frequently created in minorities a deep-seated, justified suspicion and distrust of whites, although whites may interpret this as a psychological problem or personality deviation. Minority soldiers may interpret their commander's actions as being racially motivated much more often than the commander does.

The Position of the Company Commander Within the Organization Hierarchy. Although officers and noncommissioned officers below the company commander seek his<sup>2</sup> consent and give him advice on appropriate action, and officers above him formulate policy and procedure for him to follow, the company commander is the most visible influence on the career and state of mind of the minority soldier. He is the person responsible for the effectiveness and welfare of his troops, the person the soldier looks to for protection and support, and the mediator in conflicts among his men.

#### Planning the Training Program: Underlying Strategy

Five goals initially were hypothesized for the commanders:

1. Greater understanding of the conditions and issues promoting racial separation and conflict in the United States;
2. Awareness of methods for analyzing the cohesiveness and level of racial tension within a military unit;
3. Enhanced skill at interpersonal relations with members of other ethnic groups so that problems can be discussed and plans made for their solution;
4. Greater ability to coordinate the development and implementation of equal opportunity programs within the unit; and
5. Improved skill at monitoring the results of efforts to reduce racial tensions.

These objectives were considered estimates based on several years of race relations experience with commanders and reflected what a company commander needs to do to fulfill successfully the requirements of AR 600-21.

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<sup>2</sup>Use of the terms "he," "his," and "him" should be understood to refer to both men and women.

To check whether these were the most appropriate goals, a series of interviews was arranged with company commanders and enlisted men to discuss racial problems, race relations policies and programs, the results of policies and programs, and command support. Through these interviews, the expressed needs of commanders and enlisted men could be compared with the estimate of needs represented by the five instructional objectives.

Interviewing commanders was important to (a) understand more about the commander's ideology concerning racial problems, race relations programs, and the results of such programs; and (b) understand more about the commander's perceived costs and benefits of involvement in race relations work in the unit.

The commander's ideology is relevant to the training program because his beliefs about racial problems will influence his interpretation of instruction on the subject. His responses to interview questions could also anticipate points of conflict in the tryout classes. His perceptions of costs and benefits of efforts in race relations is relevant to his motivation. If involvement is seen more as a burden than a relief, he may not have the initiative, innovativeness, and persistence for a successful race relations program.

Interviewing enlisted men would indicate the urgency they felt for action in race relations, what actions they perceived being done to what effect, and what might be done to improve life. Enlisted men might well perceive things outside the awareness of the commander.

### Conducting the Interviews

Subjects. Individual interviews of 42 officers and group interviews of 104 enlisted personnel were conducted at six installations during March and April 1973. In the officer sample, 62% of the interviewees were white and 38% were minority group members, primarily black. The 104 enlisted men were interviewed in 37 groups: 50% were white, 33% black, 7% Puerto Rican, 9% Mexican-American, and 1% Asian. The overrepresentation of minority group members in both officer and enlisted samples was deliberate to insure that a wide range of opinion was available from those persons whose futures in the Army may be most significantly affected.

Interview Protocols. The interviews were scheduled by the Race Relations/Equal Opportunity office at each installation. The officers and enlisted men were told before the interview that the interviewer belonged to a civilian organization working to develop a training program in race relations for commanders. The purpose of the interview was explained, and they were told that although interviews lasted from 30 to 60 minutes, depending upon the responsiveness of the interviewee, it was seldom possible to ask all the questions because of time restrictions.

In addition, some issues were explored in more depth if the interviewee had particular experiences or strong feelings. Because of this variability, the overall interview results probably do not allow the kind of cross-post comparisons that a standardized survey would allow. However, much information and a better understanding of what to expect in the training classes emerged.

#### Summary of Interview Results

Most significantly, company commanders, enlisted men, and those who formulate race relations doctrine have very different ideas about what needs to be done, how it is to be accomplished, and what constitutes positive results. These different ideas interfere with understanding and correcting race relations problems.

Several components of the commander's beliefs interfere with his involvement and support for race relations efforts. First, most commanders, particularly whites, see little need to protect minorities against discrimination; they perceive discrimination as infrequent, as the invention of minorities, or as occurring outside the influence of the commander. Second, they see the race relations program as having been developed for the enlisted men who "own" the race problem; they do not see the chain of command as part of the problem. Third, commanders see far more cost than benefit in improving race relations and so maintain only token programs in their units.

The effects of the commanders' beliefs and consequent low level of involvement in race relations were clearly visible in interviews with enlisted men. Enlisted men differed greatly in their perceptions of the importance of racial issues and in their concern about racial problems, but they concurred that no significant programs of race relations existed in their units. Education programs available were seen as interesting but ineffective; efforts to set up race relations councils completely lacked credibility; the chain of command was seen as unresponsive to complaints and as relatively uninvolved with the needs of the men unless an officer might be embarrassed by a complaint or by an incident in his unit. A large percentage of the enlisted men seemed to feel either frightened of or angry toward the company chain of command.

#### Company Commanders' Training Curriculum

Analysis of the interviews led to several additional goals for the curriculum:

1. To persuade the commanders that the topics in the training curriculum were relevant to their jobs;

2. To demonstrate the reality and pervasiveness of racial discrimination; and
3. To shift the commanders' attention from the enlisted men to the chain of command and its actions.

The original hypotheses about the lesson objectives of the curriculum were still considered tenable, but possibly not attainable in a brief program. Based on the interview data and rationale developed as a result of experience in working with commanders, the five broad goals in learning objectives were finalized and were used as the lesson objectives. For each lesson objective, the training topics required to fulfill the lesson objectives were determined. For each training topic, a lesson outline and the required program of instruction was then developed. The lesson objectives and training topics included in the curriculum are outlined in Table 1.

During the field trials, topic 7 (Surveys and Small Group Discussion Methods) was completely revised. Topic 8 is the revised version, Understanding the Results of Surveys and Small Group Discussions. Only one version was presented to a given class.

#### FIELD TRYOUTS OF THE CURRICULUM

##### Subjects

The field tryouts of the curriculum were conducted at two Army installations during May, June, and July 1971. The tryouts were conducted at Post A, May 21-25 and June 4-8. At Post B, the tryouts were conducted July 16-20 and July 30-August 4. A different instruction method was used in each class on a given post. The subjects were first lieutenants who were either platoon leaders or company executive officers (XO's), captains who were company commanders, and majors who had been company commanders and were assigned as battalion XO's. The distribution of officers by race at each installation is shown in Table 2.

The ethnic composition of the class and the nature of minority participation influenced the progress of the class. Table 2 does not fully convey the extent or direction of minority influence within the class groups. For example, one black officer at Post A, class 11, and one Hawaiian officer at Post B, class 1, were relatively quiet and unassertive. A Mexican-American at Post A, class 11, and an Indian at Post B, class 11, were both strongly in favor of assimilation into the white culture and openly disagreed with much of the instruction about minority groups. At Post A, class 1, when minority group members were active and supported both one another and the instructors, white commanders seemed more careful about what they said and more likely to examine their own attitudes rather than simply to deny, rationalize, or blame. When minority members were active and disagreed with the instructors, the class

Table 1  
Objectives and Training Topics

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Objective I.      Minority Perspectives

1. Mexican Americans
2. Puerto Ricans
3. Black Americans

Objective II.     Methods for Change

4. Resistance to Change
5. Games
6. Stereotypes
7. Survey and Small Group Discussion Methods
8. Understanding the Results of Surveys and Small Group Discussions

Objective III.    Perceptions of Role Relationships

9. Role Expectations
10. Theory X and Theory Y
11. Personal Communication
12. Guidelines

Objective IV.     Program Development

13. Commander's Role
14. Capitalizing on Interest
15. Approaches to Dealing with Racial Tension
16. External Consultants

Objective V.       Program Monitoring

17. Seminar as Evaluation
  18. Dysfunction Indicators
-

seemed more openly hostile to minorities and to the race relations program. This occurred at Post B, Class II, and Post A, Class I. When minority group members were relatively inactive or nonsupportive of one another, they tended to be ignored, and whites tended to express negative attitudes toward race relations efforts.

Table 2

Distribution of Officers by Race and Site of Curriculum Tryout

Site	White	Black	Indian	Hawaiian	Japanese	Mexican	Total	minority
Class I								
Post A	4	2	0	1	1	0	8	50
Post B	8	1	1	1	0	0	11	27
Class II								
Post A	6	1	0	0	0	1	8	25
Post B	7	2	0	0	0	0	9	22
Total	25	6	1	2	1	1	36	31

Conflict between black and white officers was observed in various forms in every class, but seldom were the conflicts acknowledged and dealt with directly in the group. In one group, a black lieutenant was asked his reaction to being addressed by a black enlisted man (EM) as "brother lieutenant." He said under some circumstances this would be acceptable. Several white officers counseled him to think of himself as an officer first and a black second, although their reactions during the rest of the class suggested that they thought of black officers as blacks first and officers second. In several classes, black officers raised doubts about the effectiveness of race relations programs and were told by white officers either that such criticism was unjustified or that blacks now had an advantage in the Army as a result of race relations programs.



### Data Collection Procedures

The data collection team consisted of four instructors and one observer, all trained race relations facilitators. The team was half black and half white, half male and half female. The observer was a white, former Army officer who had experience in dealing with Army commanders on race-related problems. Subjects were seated at tables arranged in the shape of a "U." The facilitator sat in the open end of the "U," and the observer sat to the rear in a position where he could see and hear the class interactions while unobtrusively taking notes. A facilitator was responsible for presenting a given topic in the curriculum; back-up assistance was available, if required, from another facilitator who served as the assistant instructor for that topic. The total time required to complete the course was 36 hours. However, several subjects in each class missed blocks of instruction because of "more pressing business."

### Methods of Presenting the Curriculum

Some Underlying Considerations. Research had indicated and experience had confirmed that new information about race relations would be resisted by a variety of ego-defensive maneuvers. Negative attitudes about minorities once were simultaneously among the most widely held and vigorously denied characteristics of American culture. The personality that is inclined toward prejudicial beliefs clings to and defends those beliefs despite evidence to the contrary. It was anticipated that a number of students in each class would resist the presentation of material contrary to their acculturation or psychological needs. In addition, literature on organizational change suggests that conditions under which resistance can be expected to emerge coincide with the structure of the Army race relations program.

Review of FM 21-6, "Techniques of Military Instruction," suggests that a substantial amount of resistance is not anticipated in normal military classroom situations. Therefore, the techniques outlined there were not considered the most suitable for a presentation on race relations.

Instructional Methods. Two methods were developed for instruction, and they can be viewed as strategies for dealing with resistance.

Method I (persuasion) requires instructors to deal with resistance in its final form: cognitive distortion. The assumption is that emotional pressures would cause some students to resist accepting information presented in class and that these students would distort this information by a variety of methods. Using Method I, the instructor would screen class reactions for this distortion and would correct it. The instructor's role under this method was one of persuasion.

In practical application, the instructor categorized student reaction into one of several possible categories.

The student can

1. Fail to hear or see the new information, or he can misunderstand it so that he perceives it to fit his existing values;
2. Hear or see the information accurately but deny its validity so as to maintain intact the integrity of his existing values;
3. Shift his existing opinions and beliefs toward the position of the new information and attempt to accommodate both in his value system;
4. Abandon his previous value position and shift his beliefs and opinions to a point centering on the new information; or
5. Downgrade or abandon his previous opinions and beliefs, minimize or deny the importance of the new information, and withdraw from involvement in the issue as a whole.<sup>3</sup>

If the reaction fell in the first category, the instructor "actively-listened" until the student was satisfied with the instructor's statement of the student's position. The instructor then reviewed evidence supporting the point in question, pointed out flaws in the student's reasoning, introduced new supporting evidence, or used other persuasive techniques until the student either corrected his distorted perception or it became apparent that no correction was possible.

If the reaction fell in the third category, the instructor made a value judgment as to whether the student's effort at accommodation was sufficient to preserve the value of the point in question. If not, the instructor used persuasive techniques to encourage further movement on the part of the student. In either case, the instructor praised the student for being open to the new information.

If the reaction fell in the fourth category, the instructor praised the student and pointed out the practical value of his new beliefs whenever possible.

If the reaction fell in the fifth category, the instructor explained reasons for the importance of the point in question and the negative consequences of a failure to see the importance of the point. Whenever possible, the instructor would cite Army Regulations (AR), the Universal Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), or other respected sources.

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<sup>3</sup> Henderson, George. To Live in Freedom. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972, p. 192.

Method II (rational inquiry) deals with resistance at the emotional level as opposed to the cognitive. It attempts to provide the student with a safe environment in which he can explore his feelings and examine their implications without fear.

Teachers and supervisors can change attitudes by uncritically accepting questions and ideas and by helping others develop sophisticated skills of inquiry--stating, refining, and testing hypotheses. To do so, teachers must orient their techniques to their students' or subordinates' backgrounds, needs, and abilities. The superior human relations environment has many components, including the following:

1. It accepts each individual as he is and encourages accepting behavior on the part of each group member toward every other member.
2. It leads each member to an understanding of the reasons why different people live as they do.
3. It fosters interaction among representatives of different groups by granting each representative equal status.
4. It makes it possible for each group member to achieve, but not at the expense of others (Henderson, 1972).

In practical application, (a) material presented by the instructor and the ideas or objections of students were not labeled as right or wrong but simply as worth consideration. (b) After responding to a student's question or objection, the instructor turned the question over to the class in an effort to foster student-student reaction. (c) The class was conducted on a first-name basis in an effort to reduce rank barriers. (d) The instructor praised expression of feelings and protected students from rejection or overly harsh criticism from other students by finding some merit in any statement made by a student. (e) The instructor encouraged honest (but nonrejection) feedback among students. (f) The instructor attempted to teach the process of rational inquiry by translating student expression into a hypothesis that could be validated or invalidated by evidence that had been made available to the class.

#### Methods of Evaluating Curriculum Impact

The impact of these field trials was evaluated (a) by observation of the group process in class, and (b) by completion of a questionnaire.

Observation. The designated observer in the data collection team observed and recorded the group process, or the assistant instructor listened to the class reaction and made appropriate notes during the class presentation. No standardized set of observational categories was used. Records consisted of the comments of individuals in the class

that seemed to best illustrate what the observer saw as the major concern of the group. The observations made in each class formed a rough outline of the major themes that emerged. Observers were not trying to document either change or the lack of it; they were looking for concerns that could be expected to recur in future classes. Consequently, the material collected often pertained to points of conflict between the class and the instructor.

Questionnaire. A questionnaire was administered to each participant at the end of the course or sections of the course. Although the form of the questionnaire changed after the first two tryout groups, all versions covered the lesson objectives, the course topics, and the quality of instruction. Each of the five lesson objectives was rated along a 5-point scale according to three criteria: (a) relevance to the real problems and demands of race relations at the company level; (b) emphasis--how much emphasis each objective should be given in the course; (c) attainment--how much change the person experienced toward the objective. An additional section asked for comments about new skills or information that might increase course effectiveness.

The 17 course topics were evaluated along three dimensions: (a) relevance to the needs of a company commander; (b) enjoyment--how much the topic was liked; (c) learning--how much was learned from the topic. This section was administered at the end of the whole course to the first training group. At their suggestion, later groups were asked to fill out this section daily. Finally, the participants were asked to comment about each of the films and practical exercises in the course. Because not all officers filled in the questionnaires, some of the results may be less valid than if responses were more complete.

## RESULTS

### Method of Instruction

Trainer consensus indicated that the two instructional methods did not produce any significant differences in dealing with the emotional and organizational issues that emerged in class discussions. Although the trainees felt that both approaches were valuable in dealing with such issues, they felt neither method was consistently superior. The results indicated that there were important variables operating within the classroom situation that seemed to interact with content and method of instruction because the same topic taught by the same methods and instructor to different groups seemed to have different impacts.

In one class, the method of persuasion (Method 1) appeared to be successful in presenting the topic, "Methods of Interpreting Subtle Indications of Tension." The content was accepted by a large portion of the commanders in that most agreed with the method of records-keeping described in the class. This block of instruction lends itself to a

Method I presentation because of its internal structure. In essence, the block is a series of logical statements leading to a conclusion: if A, then B; if B, then C; etc. At each step in the process, the class is invited to agree or disagree. When the conclusion has been reached, it is very difficult for class members to disagree because they have already agreed with the major and minor premises leading to the conclusion. In this class, even though many officers were obviously uncomfortable with the implication of the conclusion, they agreed with its correctness.

However, this method was not successful in presenting the same topic to a class on another post. In fact, none of the white students in the class was persuaded by the presentation described above. Though the class had to concur with the logical nature of the presentation, their argument was that such records were too dangerous to keep because there was no method of guaranteeing their security. Though the instructor thoroughly pointed out logical contradictions in class arguments about security, the class remained unconvinced and became increasingly uncooperative about exploring the issues.

The rational inquiry method (Method II) appeared to be successful in presenting the topic, "Games Soldiers Play," to one of the pilot classes. This presentation seemed to have a powerful impact on the class. The instructor discussed emotionally loaded topics in a non-judgmental fashion and was supportive of critical thinking; the class modeled their behavior after his. The class members admitted their own ineffective behavior, voiced criticism of their superiors, and dealt with other "hot" topics in a comfortable way.

However, this method was not successful in presenting the same topic to a class on another post. The instructor's behavior was essentially that of rational inquiry, but the students did not accept the instructor's observations about the destructive properties of games. Students greeted some of the material with laughter, and several observed with pleasure that the class had taught them how to be better gamesmen--the exact opposite of the course's purpose.

#### Observations of Commanders' Reactions

The group processes and the reactions of the commanders in each class were observed by the assigned observer (and for some classes, by the assistant instructor). A summary of these observations, as related to each of the five lesson objectives, is given below. A more detailed synopsis is included as Appendix B.

It is important to recognize that many of the observations of the group process in the tryout classes are interpretations made by a single observer. In addition, observers were looking for signs of resistance, not agreement, and consequently a selective perception of events probably

occurred and influenced the description of the group process. The observations are reported, however, because they provide some useful insights and typically demonstrate problems in training commanders in race relations.

Objective I, Minority Perspectives. Most commanders found it hard to accept and to deal with information about the historical relationships between several minority groups and the white majority. Almost no one questioned the accuracy of the information; perhaps that is a reason it was perceived as so threatening. It was anticipated that the information would make the commanders consider what kinds of constructive coping responses needed to be made, and in some instances the material did have that effect. But in many cases commanders dealt with their sense of conflict and tension by denial, rationalization, and minimization.

Objective II, Methods of Change. A dilemma for the commander emerged: If he is skeptical about the need for change in race relations, can his own superiors and subordinates really believe in such change? Is race relations so important to the Army that playing games is really going to be given up? What justification can the commander find for giving vigorous support to race relations programs? At this point, the answer still seems to be "not much."

Objective III, Perceptions of Role Relationships. Another dilemma emerged: How can one maintain a respectful distance from subordinates and still communicate enough personal interest to develop the trust needed to cope with racial issues? Perhaps the "cure" of personal contact is worse than the condition it is supposed to correct. For many, the requirements of the organization may be used to mask personal anxieties about interracial contact.

Objective IV, Program Development. Doubts about the significance of racial problems, doubts about the concern of superiors with racial problems, and anxiety about contact with minority group members seemed to culminate in a defensive compromise. Race programs will receive only token support because the costs of the commanders' involvement with race relations seem to far outweigh the benefits.

Objective V, Program Monitoring. Monitoring a program to which one is giving only token support seems of little use. In fact, it seems to carry more dangers in the form of mistaken inference and misused information than it does benefits. Consequently informal rather than formal monitoring probably will be used.

### Commanders' Ratings of the Lesson Objectives

Commanders rated each of the five lesson objectives for relevance, attainment of objectives, and degree of emphasis required. These data are shown in Table 3. The 5-point relevance scale ranged from "little or no relevance" with a weight of 1, to "high relevant" with a weight of 5.

Table 3

### Commanders' Ratings of the Five Lesson Objectives

Lesson objective	Objective relevance		Objective attainment		Emphasis needed	
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank
I Minority perspective	4.01	2	2.93	2	2.86	4
II Methods of change	3.94	3	3.01	1	2.97	3
III Perceptions of role relationships	3.91	5	2.87	3	3.26	2
IV Program development	3.93	4	2.77	5	3.63	1
V Program monitoring	4.04	1	2.78	4	2.20	5
Mean rating	3.97		2.87		2.98	

As shown in Table 3, commanders rated all of the lesson objectives as relevant, with all of the ratings approximating a weight of 4. Eighty percent to 87% of the commanders rated each objective either "relevant" or "highly relevant."

For the attainment factor, commanders were required to indicate the extent to which they experienced any change in the direction proposed by the objective. This factor ranged from "no change" (1) to "very considerable change" (5). The ratings for each objective approximate the middle rating factor, "moderate change," with a weight of 3. At least 62% of commanders indicated at least a moderate change for objectives I-IV. Only 50% were influenced to the same extent by Objective V.

Finally, commanders were asked to indicate those objectives that should be given the most emphasis in the course. The factor ranged from "least emphasis" (1) to "most emphasis" (5). Review of Table 3 shows that Objective IV (Program Development) and III (Perceptions of Role Relationships) should receive the most emphasis, and Objective V (Program Monitoring), the least. It should be noted that the largest percentage of commanders rated Object I (Minority Perspective) as needing the most (36%) and the least (45%) emphasis.

#### Commanders' Ratings of the 17 Blocks of Instructions

Commanders rated each of the 17 blocks of instruction for relevance, degree of enjoyment, and extent of learning achieved. These data and their rank ordering are shown in Table 4. These scales, similar to those described earlier, are typical 5-point likert-type scales.

Rankings of the commanders' ratings of relevance indicated that Role Expectations (8), Commander's Role (12), Personal Communications (10), and Games (5) were the four most relevant topics. Surveys (7), Black Americans (3), Mexican Americans, and Theory X and Y (9) were judged to be the least relevant.

Ranking the commanders' ratings of enjoyment revealed that Games (5), Role Expectations (8), Personal Communications (10), and Guidelines (11) were enjoyed the most. Black Americans (3), Mexican Americans (1), External Consultants (15), and Surveys (7) were enjoyed the least.

Similarly, a review of the rankings of mean learning ratings shows that commanders learned the most from Guidelines (11), Games (5), Role Expectations (8), and Puerto-Ricans (2), while learning the least from Black Americans (3), Capitalizing (13), Theory X and Y (9), and Surveys (7). Apparently the material presented on Puerto Ricans was new to the commanders, whereas the material on black Americans was not.

In summary, Games and Role Expectations were considered to be the most relevant, most enjoyed and provided the most learning, whereas Black Americans and Surveys were at the negative end of the continuum.

#### Commanders' Evaluation of the Films Used as Educational Aids

The four motion pictures used in the course were generally perceived as valuable supplements to the instructional program. Comments about each of the four films follow.

No More Mananas (Insight Films, Paulist Fathers, Pacific Palisades, Calif.). The reaction to this film by most commanders was positive in that the movie powerfully communicated the Mexican American's feelings. Nearly all commanders felt the film was highly relevant to the discussion



Table 4  
Commanders' Ratings of the 17 Blocks of Instruction

Course topics	<u>Relevance</u>		<u>Enjoyment</u>		<u>Learning</u>	
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank
Lesson Objective I						
1. Mexican Americans	3.53	15	3.35	16	3.02	6
2. Puerto Ricans	3.73	11	3.72	11	3.18	4
3. Black Americans	3.52	16	3.26	17	2.26	17
Lesson Objective II						
4. Resistance	4.01	8	3.82	8	3.00	7
5. Games	4.13	4	4.32	1	3.35	2
6. Stereotypes	4.05	6	3.95	5	3.03	5
7. Surveys	3.21	17	3.55	14	2.72	14
Lesson Objective III						
8. Role Expectations	4.32	1	4.27	2	3.22	3
9. Theory X and Y	3.53	14	3.60	13	2.62	16
10. Personal Communications	4.17	3	4.22	3	2.95	8
11. Guidelines	4.04	7	4.17	4	3.42	1
Lesson Objective IV						
12. CO's Role	4.26	2	3.94	6	2.94	9
13. Capitalizing	4.13	5	3.65	12	2.69	16
14. Approaches	3.81	10	3.72	10	2.75	13
15. External Consultants	3.70	12	3.43	15	2.82	11
Lesson Objective V						
16. Indicators	3.84	9	3.80	9	2.77	12
17. Seminars	3.59	13	3.84	7	2.89	10

and to their life in the military. There was some concern, however, that police and other institutions were portrayed in an excessively negative manner.

Boy (Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith, New York, N.Y.). Although blunt and sometimes abrasive, this film was rated very effective and relevant to the goals of the training program. Most commanders felt the exposure to the different roles blacks and whites play was an important element of the program.

Study in Color (Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith, New York, N.Y.). Feelings were divided about this film. Some commanders felt the movie was too deep and over their heads, and others rated it the best and most effective film for starting a discussion.

Is It Always Right To Be Right? (Stephen Bosustow Productions, Santa Monica, Calif.). This film received the most positive comments from viewers because it effectively communicated its message. Some commanders recommended developing a practical exercise for use in conjunction with this film.

#### atings of Practical Exercises

The practical exercises used in the course were also seen as a useful addition to the instructional program. With only a few exceptions, the commanders regarded the practical exercises as an excellent means of making the classroom points more meaningful and relevant to their role as commanders. Many suggested that they would be able to translate the exercises into a form for use in their own programs. Commanders recommended additional practical exercises because they were useful in stimulating group discussion. Only a few participants had difficulty applying the exercises to their own situations.

#### DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The pervasiveness of complaints of discrimination within the Army suggests an urgent need for command understanding of and support for efforts to reduce instances of racial disharmony and to carry out the policies as set forth in AR 600-21. Effectiveness in implementing these policies depends on the knowledge, skills, and motivation possessed by the leaders responsible for their enforcement. Previous ARI research has shown that because there is often little meaningful, positive contact between different ethnic groups, many Army leaders lack the motivation and interpersonal skills necessary to develop and maintain cohesive, multi-ethnic units.

This 36-hour training program was developed on the basis of experiences in working with unit commanders and interviews with commanders and enlisted personnel in these commanders' units. The program included those topics judged essential to improve the commander's motivation, knowledge, and interpersonal skills essential for the resolution of multi-ethnic related problems.

To cope with some of the problems inherent in training commanders in race relations, we focused in the commander's training curriculum on: (a) understanding the relevance of the instruction to the commander's job, (b) acknowledging the reality and pervasiveness of racial discrimination, and (c) shifting the focus of attention in race relations from enlisted men to the chain of command and its actions.

In addition, we worked to develop instructional methods that could be applied to correct cognitive distortions and resolve emotional resistances blocking involvement in the Army's change effort. The approach guaranteed a relatively high level of conflict within the training classes because some fundamental beliefs and perceptions were examined and challenged. We believed that without efforts to correct misconceptions and to reduce emotional resistance evident in pretraining interviews, there would be little basis to predict more for the Army's race relations effort than noncompliance, tokenism, paternalism, or demands for assimilation. Such inaction would perpetuate the problems in communication, problem-solving, and decisionmaking that create racial discrimination and racial tension.

The research was designed to explore the effectiveness of two methods of instruction: rational inquiry, a nondirective approach; and persuasion, a more directive approach in overcoming such resistance. Neither approach was consistently effective for all topics on two different posts, resulting in the postulation of an interactive effect among course content, method of instruction, specific group process (attributed to local conditions at a given installation).

Initially, the team of instructors was faced with open hostility by the commanders. This hostility continued throughout most of the first day of each class and was only gradually replaced by respect for the professionalism of the team. Several reasons for such blatant hostility were hypothesized: (a) the team was civilian (although it included personnel with previous military service); (b) two members were female, one of them black--some commanders may have resented females, particularly a black, instructing them on how to handle their problems; (c) the response was typical initially to race relations training because commanders felt they were being imposed upon, were too busy, and did not need the training. Although it was strongly suspected that the hostility was due to a combination of all three, it was never confirmed.

Although the instructors and observers did not feel they understood all of the processes involved in specific class reactions, several factors seemed to be operating frequently enough to be considered as possible sources of influence upon the overall interactive process.

First, the extent of command support for race relations and equal opportunity programs at the battalion and brigade level seems to influence the company commander's view of the need to attend race relations classes and to examine his own beliefs and values. If there is low command support, the training program can be seen as irrelevant and suggestions for change can be more easily dismissed. If there is high command support, a commander may be more willing to cooperate because the benefits of involvement may be more clear.

Second, the commander's experience of personal involvement in incidents with racial overtones seems to influence participation in class. On several occasions the most active white participant in a class revealed that he had been the target of a complaint of racial discrimination. This experience seems to create a strong need to examine racial issues in more depth to determine if one has behaved improperly or has been unjustly accused.

Third, the commander's racial attitudes seem to determine the extent of his comfort in discussing racial issues with fellow students and with an instructor of a different ethnic group.

Fourth, the commander's background before entering the Army seems to influence his sense of involvement in minority group problems. For example, commanders from states with a reputation for oppressive treatment of minorities often seem to feel on guard against criticism, and some, perhaps, are more motivated to counteract points made about the worth of minorities and the extent of injustice they have experienced.

Fifth, some of the interpersonal norms of the Army concerning respect for rank influence reactions in class. For example, some officers find it very hard to be informal with officers of lower rank. In one of the practical exercises, for instance, the group task was to select a chairman whom they would personally prefer to be their leader in a discussion. Two majors in one class compared dates of rank and then announced to the class which one of them should be chairman. Even though some class members did not like this suggestion, no one would go against it. This lack of opposition seems to be part of a larger process of ignoring or denying interpersonal conflict because it is seen as potentially disruptive to the functioning of the group. One effect of this denial of conflict among group members was to focus and to intensify conflict between instructors and members of the group.

Although the Army is making a major effort toward reform, there seem to be a number of individual constraints operating upon commanders at the company level that reduce their involvement in race relations programs. Some of these constraints seem ultimately to involve some fundamental personal beliefs that are widely shared. There seems to be a belief system characteristic of many commanders that includes the notion that the Army is truly a melting pot in which men of diverse backgrounds labor to fit in. As a result of "playing the game," accepting the premise of the Army, and assimilating into the Army system, anyone can succeed. Relatively few seem to know or to acknowledge that, until the war in Vietnam, blacks and whites had never fought together on a fully integrated basis.

Although most believe that prejudice exists, few seem to acknowledge the reality and extent of racial discrimination in American life. For many, a race relations program should have as its ultimate goal the acceptance of the Army as a system, not the acceptance of diversity within the Army. Consequently, many commanders perceive that minority group members, particularly enlisted men, "own" the race relations problem. For these commanders, supporting the race relations program means providing education within the unit when time permits and intervening in unit conflicts when absolutely necessary to correct misunderstandings and misperceptions. Most commanders, although they acknowledge the potential connection of such activity to the mission, do not find such responsibilities meaningful or rewarding. It is likely that many commanders feel uncomfortable around people of different ethnic groups and will probably need help before they can help others improve race relations.

These facts provide strong justification for specialized training in race relations for company commanders. However, such an educational effort has many obstacles. Many of those being trained do not see themselves as having any role in the problem, any responsibility in the program, or any control over the factors that influence both the problem and the program. Consequently, this training is often experienced more as an imposition or an obligation than as an opportunity to become part of an attempt at change.

The current commanders' training curriculum could be improved by developing practical exercises more congruent with the problems of Army race relations, by including some of the standard Army publications on race relations as textbooks for the class, by providing more time for unstructured discussion by the participants, by setting aside time for training that does not conflict with other duties, and by providing opportunities for commanders during training to talk informally to enlisted men about how they perceive the response of command to racial and other unit problems. It would be possible to improve the effectiveness of the instructional methods if more were known about the kind of people who do and do not learn the material from the course and the kind of situations where the application of such knowledge does and does not

occur. Further studies of these questions are strongly recommended because they could potentially contribute to a meaningful revision of race relations education Army-wide.

For the training of commanders and of enlisted men to lead ultimately to the development of the Army company as the location of change, certain conditions are necessary that did not seem to exist on many of the posts visited. These conditions are discussed to increase awareness of how attempts to improve the Army generally and to guarantee combat effectiveness are often connected to work in the equal opportunity and treatment area. By making such connections explicit, perhaps greater collaboration among operators of different Army offices and programs will be encouraged.

On many posts, men did not describe a strong sense of belonging to the group and did not see the unit as important or attractive. Many people did not connect their own racial attitudes and associated behavior with racial problems in their units or with other signs of dysfunction; e.g., men did not see their units as important or attractive. In a number of units, high rank was not associated with high status in the eyes of the enlisted men because the chain of command ignored the needs of the men until it lost both attractiveness and credibility. Different levels of the company, and perhaps different levels of the Army as a whole, seem to conceptualize differently the type, extent, and speed of change needed in race relations and equal opportunity, and this may interfere with the development and implementation of the program. Many people who participated in this research did not understand what kind of change is needed, how important it is, and what the impact of the change would be on them.

At the most general level, to improve race relations the Army has to become concerned with the need satisfaction of all its members. A white who feels anxious, angry, and dissatisfied because of his working and living conditions is probably not going to be receptive to programs to help his fellow soldiers. The needs of all soldiers are relevant to the Army's race relations effort. Education programs are useful in informing the soldiers and their officers how things ought to be. But outside the classroom serious, persistent, and determined steps must be taken to insure that the changes described are the ones that are achieved. Thus, race relations training must lead to an internalization of the goals and values of the race relations program; the race relations regulations must be vigorously enforced; and the conditions of need satisfaction for a diverse group of people must be created in the Army. These conditions will ideally be brought about through rational, planned, mutually beneficial changes arrived at by collaboration among people representing different sectors of the Army. Hopefully, the spontaneous, destructive incidents that brought the current Army race relations program into being will not have to be repeated to make the program work.

## APPENDIX A

### INDEX OF LESSON AND TRAINING OBJECTIVES

LESSON OBJECTIVE I: To promote greater understanding of the conditions and issues promoting racial separation and conflict in the United States.

#### TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

##### A. Mexican Americans

###### Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student will learn that racist attitudes held by Anglos were of such magnitude that they had a selective influence on the evolution of American institutions that modern institutions unknowingly function in a racist fashion.
2. The student will retain certain facts about Mexican Americans relating to:
  - a. their acquisition by conquest,
  - b. their arbitrary treatment under the law, and
  - c. their search for equal status under the law and for gainful employment.
3. The student will understand that the outcome of historical forces has been to create modern day differences between Mexican Americans and Anglos, especially in relation to:
  - a. housing
  - b. educational attainment
  - c. employment
  - d. political activism

##### B. Puerto Ricans

Attitude Objective: The student should be aware of some perceptions and attitudes Puerto Rican soldiers may have about their commanders.

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should understand the nature and effects of the relationship of colonialism which has existed between the United States and Puerto Rico.
2. The student should understand certain cultural factors influence the behavior of Puerto Rican soldiers as they adjust to Army life.
3. The student should recognize differences between the experiences of Spanish-speaking soldiers of Mexican and Puerto Rican heritage.

C. Black Americans

Attitude Objectives:

1. The student will be aware of the attitudes prevalent among the contemporary generation of black soldiers well enough to identify those attitudes.
2. The student will understand the origin of these attitudes in the concepts of white supremacy and black inferiority and in the actions of individual and institutional racism and will recognize the effects of these attitudes within a military unit.
3. The student will understand how feelings of mistrust and suspicion between blacks and whites have arisen from and still perpetuate experiences of negative contact.

Knowledge Objective: The student will recognize that color played an important role in the development of the New World and that color was used to determine who would be free and who would be enslaved.

LESSON OBJECTIVE II: To increase awareness of methods for analyzing the cohesiveness and level of racial tension with a military unit.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

D. Resistance to Change

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should be aware that resistance to change is not uniform, and can be seen as good and bad.



2. The student should be familiar with the ways people deal with inner conflict.
3. The student should be familiar with the various sources of resistance to change in the personality.
4. The student should be familiar with the various sources of resistance to change in social systems.
5. The student should know that resistance to change can be overcome faster and more stably by reducing it than by overwhelming it by force.

Task Objective: The student should be able to analyze a problem situation in terms of factors contributing to change and factors inhibiting change.

#### E. Games

Attitude Objective: The student should have an appreciation for the destructive potential of both individual and institutional gamesmanship for unit race relations.

##### Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should be able to recognize both individual and organizational games.
2. The student should realize that gamesmanship is a counter-indicator of honest communication and an indicator of racial tension within the unit.

Task Objective: The student should be able to devise methods to reduce individual gamesmanship within the unit.

#### F. Stereotypes

Attitude Objective: The student should know that racial stereotyping by an individual is not necessarily predictive of that person's racial attitudes.

##### Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should know that racial stereotyping by an individual is not necessarily predictive of discriminatory behavior by that individual.
2. The student should know that stereotypes are undesirable.

3. The student should know that stereotypes serve different functions and are, therefore, susceptible to change through different techniques.
4. The student should know that stereotyping may be more a function of class than of race.
5. The student should know that stereotypes are fostered by the mass media and textbooks.

G. (1) Survey and Small Group Discussion Methods

Attitude Objectives:

1. The student will recognize many of the emotional factors that can potentially influence the expression of attitudes about race relations on surveys taken with a military unit.
2. The student will recognize some of the emotional factors which inhibit and which facilitate communication among individuals are involved in the development and in the reduction of racial tension.

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student will understand the steps involved in organizing and developing a working survey group so it will be most likely to yield the desired information about unit race relations.
2. The student will understand the steps involved in organizing and developing a small group discussion session so it will be most likely to yield the desired information about unit race relations.

G. (2) Understanding the Results of Surveys and Small Group Discussions

Attitude Objectives:

1. The student will be aware that attitude surveys taken within his unit or small group discussions involving members of different ethnic groups in his unit will probably reveal significant discrepancies between the attitudes of blacks and whites concerning race relations.
2. The student will understand some of the factors which contribute to those discrepancies in attitude including processes of change in the black community previously unrecognized by whites.

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student will recognize the link between discrepant attitudes, the factors which shaped these discrepant attitudes, and conflict between blacks and whites.
2. The student will recognize the importance of obtaining data by surveys and small group discussions as a step toward understanding race relations in his unit.

LESSON OBJECTIVE III: To improve skill in interpersonal relations with members of diverse ethnic groups so problems can be discussed and plans formulated that will facilitate a resolution of problems.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

II. Role Expectations

Attitude Objective: The student should know the social attitudes or expectations black and white troops will most likely have learned toward one another prior to their entry into the Army and how these attitudes may influence their relationship in the unit.

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should learn that the docile, submissive behavior pattern at one time characteristic of many blacks represented a reaction to the expectations of whites that blacks adopt the role of inferior in social relationships.
2. The student should learn that many blacks expected that whites would behave in an arrogant, abusive manner toward them and that such behavior on the part of whites was seen as an assertion that the white was superior to the black.
3. The student will recognize that role relationships along rank lines in the military are often complicated by the race of the superior and subordinate in the relationship such that misunderstandings of motives and intentions on both sides are likely.
4. The student will understand the importance of fair, just, and impartial treatment by white superiors toward black subordinates as a step in reducing racial tension and increasing unit effectiveness.

Task Objective: The student will establish a conscious awareness of the perceptions that contemporary young blacks have toward superior officers and change the troops' behavior by treating them fairly, justly, and equally; by recognizing the role that

the color of one's skin has traditionally played in American society well enough to establish cohesiveness and minimize tension and conflict within the unit due to the race issue.

1. Theory X and Theory Y

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should be aware of the limitations placed on his ability to command a unit which may experience racial tension by the exclusive use of authoritarian management.
2. The student should be aware of a management theory which will provide him with an alternative to authoritarian management.
3. The student should be able to decide which management system is appropriate for a specific situation.

J. Personal Communication

Attitude Objectives:

1. The student should understand that his attitudes may influence how accurately he decodes messages from others and thus can influence the adequacy of his interpersonal relations.
2. The student should understand that his attitudes may influence how honestly he encodes messages to others and thus can influence the adequacy of his interpersonal relations.

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should understand that his unit will function more effectively if there is a two-way flow of honest communication.
2. The student should understand that his objectives in implementing RR/EO programs can be attained only under conditions of honest communication.
3. The student should understand that honest communication provides a basis for collaboration among soldiers of diverse groups so that interpersonal problems in the unit can be resolved.

Task Objective: The student should be familiar with at least one technique (what Gordon calls "active listening") to improve communication and be able to use it, at least on a basic level.

#### K. Guidelines

Attitude Objective: The student will be aware of some of the attitudes that he has about himself as a commander and how he sees himself in relation to his superior officer, his noncommissioned officers and his troops.

#### Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student will recognize that his perception of minority group members has developed under conditions involving little chance of equal status association and that as a result he is likely not to have developed a foundation of attitudes toward minorities supporting positive contact experiences.
2. The student should recognize that the sense of responsibility for changing distorted attitudes must come from within and that such change requires knowing one's self and one's relationships with others.
3. The student should be aware of the conflicts going on within young black soldiers who are trying to create new self-images which will portray what they believe are "manly" qualities.

LESSON OBJECTIVE IV: To improve ability to coordinate the development and implementation of programs within the unit to insure equal treatment of soldiers from different ethnic groups.

#### TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

##### L. Commander's Role

#### Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should know that there are several principles accepted as widely applicable in intergroup relations.
2. The student should know that there are two ways to most successfully effect change in large portions of the population.
3. The student should be familiar with the requirements for company commanders stated in the latest draft of AR 600-21.
4. The student should understand that problem-solving has three components.

5. The student should be aware that a group can be used to influence its members.
6. The student should be aware of positive actions he can take to facilitate communications and actions regarding improved race relations within his unit.

Task Objectives:

1. The student should be able to formulate and weigh pros and cons for issues concerning the establishment of a unit race relations or human relations council.
2. The student should then be able to establish this council.

M. Capitalizing on Interest

Attitude Objectives:

1. The student will appreciate the importance of developing a race relations program which is relevant to the felt needs of soldiers.
2. The student will be more accepting of the value of listening to the men in his unit as a way of fulfilling his responsibilities in the area of race relations and equal opportunity.

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student will learn a series of steps useful in becoming more aware of race relations in a military unit.
2. The student will learn some of the more common complaints made by minority group soldiers about their life in the Army.
3. The student will learn some guidelines useful in planning followup activities after receiving a complaint of racial discrimination.

N. Approaches to Dealing with Racial Tension

Attitude Objectives:

1. The student should recognize the importance of effective two-way communication to foster understanding among officers, among enlisted men, and between officers and enlisted men in units comprised of men from diverse ethnic backgrounds.

2. The student should recognize that the credibility of a commander is often based upon the understanding his subordinates have of the basis of his decisions. Consequently, making sure that the content and basis of command decisions is understood is a step toward increasing the credibility of the chain of command.

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should be aware that inadequate rather than adequate communication is the norm in many large organizations, and that efforts to foster improved communication are frequently needed.
2. The student should be aware of some guidelines for reducing confusion and misunderstanding as a factor effecting race relations in his unit.

Task Objective: The commander should be aware of some techniques for approaching problems of individual and institutional racism in his unit used by other commanders.

0. External Consultants

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The commander will know some of the factors to consider in deciding whether to involve an outside consultant to assist him in developing a race relations program.
2. The commander will know what steps he will have to take to work effectively with an outside consultant.
3. The commander will know what responsibilities he has under AR 600-21 for the development of a race relations program.
4. The commander will know a number of agencies on most military posts which can provide him with consultation and/or other services which can assist him in fulfilling his responsibilities under AR 600-21.

LESSON OBJECTIVE V: To improve skill in monitoring the results of efforts to reduce racial tension.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

P. Seminar as Evaluation

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should be able to recognize three indicators of healthy communication within the unit.
2. The student should be aware of the limitations of the seminar or rap session as an indicator of racial tension.

Task Objective: The student should have a greater ability to identify hidden agendas in a group discussion.

Q. Dysfunction Indicators

Knowledge Objectives:

1. The student should know certain indicators of unit racial health.
2. The student should be aware of one method of collecting and interpreting data on those indicators.



## APPENDIX B

### SYNOPSIS OF OBSERVATIONS OF CLASS BEHAVIOR

#### METHOD I

##### Lesson Objective I

Observations of class reactions to topics covering Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Black Americans included the following:

Post A: Many of the perceptual distortions and intergroup processes which impair race relations operated during class. A number of times, commanders heard and agreed with new information but could not apply it to their own situation. For example, commanders condemned institutional racism and concluded quite logically that as commanders "we can't let what happened in the past interfere with performance today." However, they then said that they "could do nothing about institutional racism, so there was no use thinking more about it." Another major theme was the paradoxical acknowledgement of the value of more information about minorities coupled with insistence upon the fairness of maintaining the standards of white America to judge performance within the Army. Whenever information about the minority had a clear management implication, the commanders insisted that they could not act upon the information. For example, the implications of the Puerto Rican emphasis upon "machismo" for job placement in the Army were met with comments that commanders could not fit personalities to jobs. When it was suggested that ignoring the implications of the information might be poor management, the commanders presented themselves as defending the standards of the Army.

Post B: This group was more outspoken in defending the "standards of the Army." Class members asked why the Army should "stoop to the weak" and asked "how can I respect people like that?" When confronted with evidence the "melting pot" has not worked, one commander said that the Army should still operate as if it works.

When confronted with evidence of discrimination within the Army, commanders said it was not serious, that the Army can't change just to please a minority and that minorities' complaints are hurting the Army worse than the Army is hurting the minorities.

When hearing the history of minority groups in America, comments were made that it is not always bad to deny people their rights, that not every group needs to have high skill jobs, and that not all minority groups in the past were ready to decide their own fate.

### Lesson Objective II

Observations of class reactions to presentations under Lesson Objective II on Resistance to Change, Games, Stereotypes, Surveys, and Discussion Groups included the following:

Post A: Interest in discovering the factors causing tension within a unit was apparent, but much anxiety existed about dealing with these causal factors. As a result, the class appeared blocked from taking affirmative actions. All recognized the existence of gamesmanship in the Army and acknowledged its negative impact on race relations, but most felt that gaming was generally rewarded in Army life and honesty was a definite risk.

Post B: This group felt that minorities are the ones who are showing resistance and playing interpersonal games. Minority group soldiers were seen as disliking those in authority, deciding to avoid whites in the unit, and as rejecting the wisest course--assimilation into the Army.

### Lesson Objective III

Observations of class reactions to topics covering Role Expectations, Theory X and Theory Y, Personal Communication and Guidelines to Improved Interpersonal Relations included the following:

Post A: The effects of previous experiences of racial isolation became apparent as class members expressed anxiety about trying to work out racial problems through personal contact with members of other groups. Some officers commented on how hard it was to admit what one's attitudes really are. Others expressed concern about telling others what they felt toward him. Some said it is painful to think about how one is seen by members of another ethnic group. And comments were made about feeling discomfort when one has to investigate complaints of discrimination or confront someone who is prejudiced.

Post B: Conflicts between role requirements and personal inclinations were obvious. Commanders who preferred the social distance their role as commander allowed them were concerned to discover that their men were sizing up their social attitudes and might want to know them on a more personal level. These commanders expressed anxiety that they would lose their effectiveness if they were more personal in relating to the men. Another smaller group felt that part of the race problem was that people did play roles rather than got to know each other as individuals. The two factions argued but could reach no resolution.

#### Lesson Objective IV

Observations of class reactions to topics covering the Commander's Role in Race Relations, Capitalizing on Unit Interest, Approaches to Racial Tensions, and Using External Consultants included the following:

Post A: Discussion of making contact with minority troops and with setting up workable grievance procedures reawakened old doubts and aroused new anxieties. Were racial issues really important enough to go to all this trouble? Could one really trust people who made complaints of discrimination? Will minorities really respond positively to all these efforts when all they do in the unit is stay by themselves and gripe? How do I know honesty and openness on my part won't make things worse?

Post B: Setting up grievance procedures would be of little use. Soldiers are always complaining and the substandard soldiers complain the most. Most of the complainers reject help.

#### Lesson Objective V

Observations of class reactions to topics covering the Seminar as an Evaluation Tool and on the Use of Indicators of Racial Tension included the following:

Post A: Great fear was expressed about maintaining written statistics in the unit to monitor whether discrimination was occurring. Comments were made that such data could fall into the hands of black militants or might appear in an underground newspaper and be used to discredit the commander.

Post B: This class seemed to find the collection of statistics on the unit somewhat unsettling. Some questioned the validity of any inferences made from this data about race relations. Many commented, for example, that differences between blacks and whites in Article 15s were not due to race or to discrimination but to the frequency of offenses. Commanders were not too sympathetic to the idea that more offense might stem from greater feelings of pressure on the minority group.

#### Method II

##### Lesson Objective I

Observations of class reactions to topics covered by Lesson Objective I are included in the following:

Post A: Negative feelings toward minorities were quite pronounced in this class. Evidence of past injustices evoked statements like "Don't tell me, I didn't do it," "Don't ask me to do anything about it," and "I think its unfair to ask us to treat people according to their backgrounds." Some class members accused the instructors of deliberately distorting the facts to make them feel bad. Others said it was not right to make them feel inadequate or helpless, particularly since they were doing everything right. The class insisted their comments were responses to the content of instruction, even though the feelings expressed toward minority instructors were substantially more negative than toward white instructors who were saying essentially the same thing.

Post B: This group was rather secure in the notion that minorities bring on their own problems. They use discrimination as a crutch, reject whites who want to help them, don't even try to learn the ways of whites, and resent authority. While many acknowledge that injustices had been done to minority groups, class members pointed out that "colonialism is not really too bad," "that we treated Puerto Rico better than the Russians treated Czechoslovakia" and that there will "never be Utopia."

#### Lesson Objective II

Observations of class reaction to topics covered under this objective included the following:

Post A: Conformity, not racism, was seen as the crucial issue. While it is true that some injustices do occur, that gaming and stereotypes are not constructive, the best resolution for the minority is to go along with the system.

Post B: This class seemed to have conflict about whether the Army system could or should be opposed when it operated in a racist fashion. Some said messages from DA seemed sincere about the need and desire for change in race relations, but local superiors' support for these DA directives was not so clear. Playing games still seemed the local norm despite the call from DA for honesty and commitment.

#### Lesson Objective III

Observations of class reactions to topics covered under this Lesson Objective included the following:

Post A: Great anxiety was expressed about letting subordinates know a commander on a personal level. Playing the role was expected by superior officers and an officer could hurt himself by being too friendly. Then, too, one never knows what an enlisted man will do with information about

an officer's personal beliefs. A number of commanders were concerned at the thought of being seen so negatively by minority soldiers but others felt this was simply part of the job.

Post B: Again, many concerns were expressed about the outcomes of a close relationship between an officer and his subordinates.

#### Lesson Objective IV

Observations of class reactions to topics covered under this Lesson Objective included the following:

Post A: Great anger was expressed at discussion of approaches to problem-solving. Commanders said such special approaches are not the commander's job. Others said it would do no good. Others felt such matters should not be pushed. Most agreed the problems were not due to discrimination and so complaints were not the issue. The issue was misunderstanding due to cultural differences and what the commander needed was to know all about the minority soldiers' culture.

Post B: Doubt was expressed about the need for such special steps. After all the racial problem is not that serious. Several officers said that they felt no internal commitment to the race relations program but they would do what was specifically required and monitored. This was not said with hostility, but rather with the assurance that the commander and the race relations effort can peacefully coexist without either one significantly influencing the other.

#### Lesson Objective V

Observations of class reactions to topic covered under this Lesson Objective included the following:

The patterns exhibited in the classes for both Post A and Post B were highly similar to those described under Lesson Objective V for Method I. These classes seemed to find the collection of data on the unit somewhat unsettling. Some questioned the validity of any inferences made from these data about race relations. Many commented that differences between blacks and whites in Article 15s were not due to race nor to race discrimination, but to frequency of offense. Commanders were not too sympathetic to the idea that more offenses might stem from greater feelings of pressure on minority groups.